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Remembrance and
Research: Some

Reflections on a Pending
Centenary—Conclusion

by Keith C. Sewell
The initial part of this discussion concluded
that the many responses to the publications of
Fritz Fischer broadened the debate on the origins
of the war of 1914. Another example of this creative
widening of the discussion is the highly perceptive exchange in 1971/72 between Joachim Remak
and Paul Schroeder.1 A decade later, the analysis of
Germany offered by David E. Kaiser drew further
attention to the deficiencies in British policy.2 In
England, A. J. A. Morris drew attention, in considerable detail, to matters half-forgotten: “radical” concerns about the direction of British foreign
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policy after 1901, and the growth of an increasingly strident anti-German lobby within the British
commercial and political elites.3 The latter was expressed at the highest level in the famous “Crowe
Memorandum” of August 1, 1907.4
Arguably an early turning point in the functioning of the European states system took place
with the collapse in the late 1880s of the diplomatic
alignment known as the “three emperors’ league.” It
was developed by the then Chancellor of Germany,
Otto von Bismarck (1815-98). This Dreikaiserbund
brought together Germany, Austria-Hungary, and
Russia. After Bismarck’s triumph over France in
1870-71, Bismarck’s policy was one of peace and
security. The Dreikaiserbund ensured that an isolated France was unable to cause serious trouble
for the new German Empire, founded in 1871. In
spite of strains, the Dreikaiserbund was effective for
much of the 1870s and 1880s. For the time being,
it ensured the diplomatic and military isolation of
France. However, it came to grief, especially after
the forced retirement of Bismarck in 1890, because
of German inability to reconcile Austro-Russian
rivalry in the Balkans. Forced by circumstances to
choose between Austria and Russia, Germany chose
Austria for both geo-political and cultural reasons.
The somewhat incongruous consequence of
Russia’s alienation from Germany’s pro-Austrian
orientation was the formation of the FrancoRussian Alliance by 1894.5 Henceforth Germany

and Austria, the “central powers” (later forming a
“Triple Alliance” with Italy) were confronted by
a Franco-Russian combination to the west and
east respectively. The “militarism” of Germany—
largely inherited from Prussia—may be at least
partly explained by her central position in Europe.
Germany was the only great power in Europe that

Arguably, the British acted
the part of Ahab, who,
although he already had much
wealth, coveted and seized
Naboth’s vineyard (I Kings
21.1-28).
had a common frontier with three other great powers.6 Strengthened by their alliance with Russia,
successive French governments now sought to detach Italy from her association with the “central
powers” and harbored the ambition of re-acquiring
the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine (lost in 1871)—
an objective impossible to contemplate without a
general war.
The emergent Franco-Russian alliance was of
deep concern to Great Britain. Acting in concert,
these two powers could challenge the position of
Great Britain in Africa and Asia respectively. At the
same time, any prospect of an Anglo-German alignment came to nothing—notwithstanding royal,
spiritual, and cultural ties. Great Britain could not
provide Germany with aid in the military protection of her land frontiers, while Germany could not
support Great Britain in Asia or Africa. The initial
development of the German high-seas fleet can be
viewed as an attempt to gain greater leverage in her
relations with Great Britain. Germany was never in
a position to challenge British maritime supremacy
in this period.
In the 1980s, Paul Kennedy, in two densely argued studies, discerned that British entry into the
1914 conflict was, in truth, driven by her FrancoRussian commitments and fear of German industrial strength and success, rather than by honorable concerns for Belgian neutrality.7 In practice,

once attention was properly widened beyond the
German violation of Belgian neutrality, the question of Russian policy objectives (and British perceptions thereof) in the pre-August 1914 situation
could never be excluded from any adequate discussion on the outbreak of the war.8 For Great Britain,
her relations with Russia in central Asia, where the
security of India was of paramount consideration,
were both fraught and delicate.9
As the generation of Fischer enthusiasts passed
from the English scene, a much more nuanced
analysis of the period 1904-14 was offered by Keith
Wilson in a series of studies marked by considerable
depth and perception. In recent decades, Wilson
has done more than any other English historian to
open up discussion on these issues.10 And the context changed. In 1989 the Berlin Wall came down,
and in 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed. Access to
Russian archives is still not easy but is not impossible. Certainly, our view of what Butterfield called
“the Russian connection” is now more detailed
than in his lifetime. A steady flow of studies more
than confirms his mid-century assertions and vindicates Gooch’s 1929 pointed cross-questioning
of Grey.11 The sometimes flamboyantly outspoken
Niall Ferguson has offered an account that is deliberately counter-Fischer and critical of the policy of
Edward Grey.12
Into the 1890s, British policy concerning alliances was characterized as “splendid isolation.” In
the new century, however, Great Britain changed
her posture dramatically. On January 30, 1902 she
signed an alliance with the Empire of Japan.13 On
April 4, 1904 she entered into a series of “friendly
understandings,” known as the Entente Cordiale,
with France; these addressed a wide range of
outstanding issues. As if this were not dramatic
enough, she signed a Convention with Russia on
August 31, 1907. In other words, by 1907 Great
Britain had come to close “understandings” with
her old enemies in Europe and Asia respectively.14
These considerations present us with a fundamental question: Why did Great Britain, after the
turn of the century, abandon its policy of “splendid
isolation” and become involved in the rival alliance
systems of the continental great powers, adherence to
which were to draw her seemingly inexorably into war
in 1914?
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Before answering this question, we need to
emphasize three points. First, as we have noted,
France and Russia had already developed a full
and close military alliance. Great Britain did not
join this alliance formally, wishing to enjoy some
continued freedom of action. The result was that
she was always in some measure an outsider, France
and Russia down to 1914 having a much closer relationship with each other than with Great Britain.
A further consequence was that the British found
themselves enduring the disadvantages of an alliance without the full advantages of alliance membership. Second, with British friendship assured,
France might become more emboldened towards
Germany, and Russia towards Austria Hungary.
Third, a growing sense of “encirclement,” coupled
with statistics that suggested an increasing relative
military inferiority, might serve to drive Germany
and / or Austria Hungary towards desperate measures.
If these were the ramifications of the British
change in policy, they were not its cause and motivation. It was the empire-minded governing
Conservative Party, with Lord Lansdowne (18451927) as Foreign Secretary, that initiated immense
changes in British foreign policy commencing in
1902. The same policy was continued, after 1905,
by their archrivals, the Liberal Party, led initially
by Henry Campbell-Bannerman (1836-1908) and
after 1908 by H.H. Asquith (1852-1928). A key to
this apparent contradiction is that the Liberal Party
was a coalition of groupings and opinions, and that
the Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey, and Asquith,
his Prime Minister for most of the relevant period, were members of the group within the party
known as the “Liberal Imperialists.”15 Their views
on domestic policy differed substantially from that
of their Conservative predecessors, but their general outlook on foreign and imperial policy did not.
Historians can fall victims to the categories
that they use to organize the vast amounts of information that they have to address. Sometimes the
categories reflect the organization of government
departments. In this case, it is important not to organize our understanding of the formulation and
implementation of high policy in this period into
separate domestic, foreign, and imperial policy categories. We might call this “the fallacy of separate
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mental boxes.” To answer the fundamental question posed above, the too often unstated truth is
that Great Britain’s turn towards an alliance (with
Japan) and “understandings” (with France and
Russia) arose from her experience of the dangers of
international diplomatic isolation at the time of the
South African War of 1899-1902.
This reality can be missed, thanks to the “separate mental boxes” fallacy. For example, in the
1960s, the scholar G.W. Monger rightly focused on
1900-07 as the crucial period of policy change, but
without sufficiently considering the significance
of the South African conflict for the momentous
changes in British foreign policy that he explored.16
This oversight was as understandable as it was
problematic. The South African conflict could be
classified as “imperial-colonial” rather than “foreign.” Certainly, the supremacy of the Royal Navy
prevented other powers from intervening, in spite
of the widespread international disapproval of the
British action. In addition, not only has the “Great
War” of 1914 overshadowed its predecessor, but
crucial documents concerning the fomenting of the
1899 conflict were also long to surface.17
In the United Kingdom the Public Records Act
(1958) as now applied provides for the release of
all but the most sensitive government documents
after thirty years—the “thirty years rule.” Prior to
its full operation, public access to documents could
take very much longer. It should not be too great
a surprise that documents relating to the British
high-level decision-making that led up to the outbreak of the (second) South African War (the “Boer
War”) in 1899 were for a long time unavailable. It
was only in the early 1950s that Ethel Drus published a series of pieces traversing the period from
the Jameson Raid of 1895/6 to the outbreak of war
in 1899. These pointed to the complicity of Joseph
Chamberlain (1836-1914), Secretary of State for
the Colonies in the crucial period 1895-1903),18
along with Cecil Rhodes (1853-1902)19 and later
Alfred Milner (1854-1925),20 in provoking military
conflict with the Afrikaner republics.21 In her wake
came important work by J.S. Marais, G.H.L. Le
May, and more recently A.N. Porter and Iain R.
Smith.22
The truth is that the driving principle of British
policy in South Africa was not the civil rights of the

uitlanders (non-citizens working in and under the
jurisdiction of the Transvaal) as such. It was actually about possession and control of the Great Reef,
with its immense bounty of gold and diamonds.23
This was a war of imperial aggression, in which
the British Empire waged war on two small and
remote republics. The plight of small nations was
as nothing when imperial objectives were in view.
Arguably, the British acted the part of Ahab, who,
although he already had much wealth, coveted and
seized Naboth’s vineyard (I Kings 21.1-28).
The policy of aggression in South Africa pursued by the ruling Conservatives provoked considerable opposition within Great Britain. The summer of 1899 was one of high tension, with families
and communities deeply divided over what was
happening. Radicals, Free Churchmen, and Free
Presbyterians opposed their government’s policies and were labeled “Pro-Boers” for their stand.
Campbell-Bannerman, the future Prime Minister,
was to accuse the British government in parliament
of employing “methods of barbarism” in South
Africa.24 In his latter years Abraham Kuyper (18371920), sometime Prime Minister of the Netherlands
(1901-6), was no friend of Great Britain and ever
cautious as to her intentions. Accordingly, he inclined towards Imperial Germany. The basis of
his caution was British aggression against the
Transvaal. He sympathized with the predicament
of the South African republics for both ethnic and
confessional reasons.25
To recap, by 1914 Great Britain had aligned itself with France and Russia, essentially for reasons
of imperial security. This alignment was not about
Belgium. That was why maintaining a policy acceptable to Russia was so important, as Butterfield
rightly discerned. What Butterfield did not explore
in any depth was why this change in high policy
became so necessary after 1902. The answer is the
strong international reaction against British action
in South Africa. Arguably, fear of being overtaken
in many key areas by Germany and or the United
States spurred the British down the path of yet more
expansion in order to try to compensate, but her actions brought about a level of isolation that was not
“splendid” but dangerous. Therefore, Great Britain
formed her alliance with Japan and “understandings” with France and Russia. The latter were al-

ways problematic at best and dangerous at worst. In
1912 Winston S. Churchill (1874-1965), then First
Lord of the Admiralty, wrote to his Prime Minister,
Asquith, rightly complaining that “Everyone must
feel, who knows the facts, that we have all the obligations of an alliance, without its advantages and
above all without its precise definitions.”26
On May 26, 1911 Grey advised the Prime
Ministers of the British Dominions,27 “we are not
committed by entanglements which tie our hands.
Our hands are free.”28 This was not strictly true.
Grey may have been being disingenuous, or may
have deceived others, having first in some measure
been self-deceived. The truth is that a close alignment with France, and especially with Russia,
would not have been acceptable to many in the
ruling Liberal Party, including many members of
Asquith’s cabinet. The “Liberal Imperialist” faction
within the Liberal Party controlled the actual conduct of foreign policy because it included the Prime
Minister and the Foreign Secretary. When the

In effect, Great Britain
had to go to war in Europe
in 1914 because of the
alignments that she had
formed arising from her
aggression in South Africa
and in order to protect her
over-extended empire.
great crisis arose in July 1914, with Grey having to
address the House of Commons under conditions
of high tension, Great Britain would have found it
extraordinarily difficult to discharge its actual and
largely secret obligations to France and Russia if
Germany had not invaded Belgium.
In effect, Great Britain had to go to war in
Europe in 1914 because of the alignments that she
had formed arising from her aggression in South
Africa and in order to protect her over-extended
empire.29 It was Ahab’s successors who endured the
judgmental consequences of his crime. There was
a strong connection between British aggressions in
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Southern Africa and the fearful bloodletting that
the British endured on the western front in 191418. God is not mocked—we reap what we sow, although perhaps with mitigation if we repent quickly. If in 1918-19 Great Britain and France emerged
victorious, theirs was only a pyric victory. They
were both severely weakened. Great Britain lost its
preeminent position. The true beneficiaries were
the United States and the Empire of Japan. Even
without a Great War, it is most likely that Great
Britain would have experienced a relative decline
in the twentieth century as other leading nations
closed the gap in the immense lead Great Britain
had opened up in the earlier nineteenth century.
Arguably, one of the worst things that may be
said of the Lansdowne-Grey policy is that it emboldened the Franco-Russian Alliance to the point
where Germany and Austria felt driven into a corner and overly inclined to risk preemptive conflict.
Under such circumstances, Austria—confronted
with the assassinations in Sarajevo on June 28,
1914—would naturally adopt a stridently severe
“anti-terrorist” stance against Serbia, viewing it as
necessary for the retention of her status as a great
power. Serbia, whose hands were far from clean, appealed successfully to Russia, the first Great Power
to mobilize its forces against other great powers
in 1914. And so it was that all domestic efforts to
keep Great Britain out of the conflict failed. Great
Britain was committed because of “entanglements”
previously incurred for essentially imperial reasons.
On the other hand, it is possible to argue that without such “entanglements,” she may have been able
to act as a credible “honest broker” and play the
part of an effective mediator and peacemaker.
These entanglements and their implications
prompt further questions: Was the great wave of
British imperial assertiveness in the late nineteenth
century inevitable? Was there another path open to
Great Britain at that time? Such questions inevitably direct our attention to the great public policy
debate, conducted in parliament and beyond, between Benjamin Disraeli (1804-81)30 and William
Ewart Gladstone (1809-98).31 Disraeli, later Earl
Beaconsfield (Conservative), stood for crown and
empire and was Prime Minister from 1874 to
1880. It was he who gave Queen Victoria the title
“Empress of India.” Gladstone (Liberal) stood for
26
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liberty and commerce and was Prime Minister
from 1868-74, 1880-86, and finally 1892-4.
Intellectually, Gladstone combined classical scholarship with Christian conviction. He was a High
Church Anglican with a strong Augustinian orientation. The confrontation between the two leaders
attained a high intensity in the late 1870s, reaching its peak in Gladstone’s “Midlothian campaign”
speeches of 1879.32 The issue seemed to come to
this: was an Ottoman Empire that repeatedly treated the Christian peoples of the Balkans with calculated cruelty to be upheld for the sake of protecting
British imperial interests against Russia? This issue
could be construed as a confrontation of Rechtsstaat
against Machtstaat, right against might, or liberty
against empire.33
Gladstone encouraged the rise of responsible
self-government in Great Britain’s colonies of
settlement.34 He presciently anticipated the preeminence of the United States in the twentieth
century.35 Following his return to office in 1880,
he vexed the empire-minded Conservatives by the
readiness with which he accepted the return of
the Transvaal to Afrikaner rule.36 Gladstone was
more accepting of openness and diversity than the
imperialists of his day. He was deeply sensible of
the distinctive and non-English national cultures
and spiritual complexion of Scotland, Wales, and
Ireland. Across the North Sea, “Kuyper,” according
to James Bratt, “admired no one in politics more
than Gladstone.”37
Opposition within his own party to his advocacy of “home rule” for Ireland eventually split the
Liberal Party in 1886 and thereby denied it office.38
It was the Conservatives—the party of empire—
who dominated British politics thereafter for almost all of the time down to 1905/6 and who went
to war in 1899. The “Liberal Imperialist” faction,
within the Liberal party, was amongst those who
were not in accord with the Gladstone-like approach to Ireland. In retrospect, it is hard not to
reflect on how much happier Anglo-Irish relations
might have been if Gladstone’s proposals, or something like them, had carried the day in the nineteenth century. Arguably Britain’s greatest Prime
Minister in the nineteenth century, Gladstone
showed his fellow countrymen an alternative way
to imperialism, but his wisdom was rejected. The

tragic consequences remain beyond human calculation.
Winston S. Churchill had seen action in the
South African conflict and was not without admiration for Great Britain’s Afrikaner enemies. In
his maiden speech to the House of Commons on
February 18, 1901 he startled members by declaring, “if I were a Boer I hope I should be fighting in
the field.”39 Of the Afrikaners he wrote, “I do sympathize with their love of freedom.”40 There are suggestions that Churchill—who certainly did not get
everything right, but whom his fellow countrymen
rightly revere for his early warnings of the Nazi threat

Arguably Britain’s
greatest Prime Minister
in the nineteenth century,
Gladstone showed his fellow
countrymen an alternative
way to imperialism, but his
wisdom was rejected. The
tragic consequences remain
beyond human calculation.
and effective leadership at the crucial juncture—was
haunted by a sense of the long-term consequences of
Great Britain’s aggression in South Africa. Even in
the critical years of 1940-41, his mind could turn to
the roots of Great Britain’s dire situation as they lay
in earlier policies. After June 1940, with France prostrate and Germany triumphant over much of the
European continent, and with Russia not yet in the
war, it was more than obvious that Great Britain’s
lifeline was the United States.
At this critical point, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt (1882-1945) appointed Harry Hopkins
(1890-1946) as his personal intermediary with
Churchill. Hopkins was born in Sioux City and
raised in Grinnell, Iowa. On January 25, 1941,
Churchill was discoursing late into the night with
Harry Hopkins, who was visiting him in England.
In the course of a wide-ranging and reflective conversation, as recorded by the ever meticulous Jack

Colville (1915-87), then Assistant Private Secretary
to the Prime Minister, Churchill ruminated ruefully that “Joseph Chamberlain had pushed us
into the Boer War and, by setting Europe against
us, had stimulated the Germans into building a
fleet.”41 If we take these words at face value, and
ponder with care their weighty implications, they
should serve to drive us to a profound reassessment
of British policy for the two decades commencing
in 1895.
From 1945 onwards, Churchill was once again
out of office—but now the Red Army was in the
heart of Europe. If we exchange “Red” for “Tsarist,”
we need to acknowledge that this was precisely the
kind of outcome only to be expected if the policies
pursued by Grey and desired by his entente partners in 1914 had been wholly successful. In 1947
Churchill reported to those closest to him that he
had dreamt of having a conversation with his muchrevered father, Lord Randolph Churchill (1849-95).
So vivid was the experience that Churchill recorded
it in detail.42 In the course of his account of the
wide-ranging conversation, which had much to say
about Russia, occurs the following exchange, concerning the policy of Joseph Chamberlain in South
Africa in 1899: [son:] “We conquered the Transvaal
and the Orange Free State”; [father:] “England
should never have done that. To strike down two
independent republics must have lowered our
whole position in the world. It must have stirred up
all sorts of things. I am sure the Boers made a good
fight.”43 Arguably, these words reflected Churchill’s
deeper sense that the consequences of British imperial aggression in South Africa had been highly
detrimental also to Great Britain herself.
As we approach the 2014 centenary of the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914, there is already a
rising tide of literature on its origins. As succeeding generations have taken a longer view of these
things, it has become easier to see how many evils
have flowed from the Great War, the manner in
which it was waged, and the dictated peace settlement. These included the collapse, rather than constitutional development, of Austria-Hungary, the
association of democracy with defeat in Germany,
the triumph of communism in Russia, the great
depression, the rise of Fascist and Nazi totalitarianism, the Second World War, and the ideological and
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military division of Europe down to the fall of the
Berlin Wall in 1989. God is not mocked (Galatians
6.7); the consequences of some actions can be expected to play themselves out even unto the third
and fourth generations (Deuteronomy 5.9).
It is to be expected that some of the new writing
on the subject will follow the old line of HeadlamMorley and the allied powers in 1919. Yet we have
learned too much for the old over-simple “save little
Belgium” standpoint to be accepted without a willful ignorance of other features of the overall international situation. We should now be prepared for new
research to take us away from the old assumptions.
As to Edward Elgar, the “Great War” broke his
heart. He had great affection for Germany. There
his musical achievements were acclaimed long before his fellow countrymen recognized them. In
later years he came to hate the way in which the
arrogant words of A.C. Benson, “Land of Hope
and Glory,” set to his “Pomp and Circumstance
March Number One” (1901), were used during the
conflict to boost morale in the face of mounting
horrors. Those who would gauge his frame of mind
on the morrow of “victory” must absorb the meaning of his aching and poignant Cello Concerto in E
minor, first performed in 1919.44
How we remember and memorialize is highly
formative. This is why it is necessary to consider
how our commemorative traditions can be highly
deceptive. What nations, including their governments, say in commemorative events and monuments can hide at least as much as they reveal.
They can overlay what has been partly or even
completely forgotten. Especially as the nations of
Europe grieve their millions of war dead, their governments may continue to resist the probing and
sifting of historians. In the case of responsibility for
the causes and consequences of the war of 1914, the
more assiduously historians pursue their calling,
the closer they come to confirming the profound
but awful truth stated centuries ago by the Apostle
Paul: “All have sinned and fallen short of the glory
of God” (Romans 3.23).
As to my grandfather, he most probably went to
his grave thinking that Great Britain had gone to
war “to save little Belgium.” With all that has happened in the twentieth century, we in the twentyfirst century ought not to be misled so easily. We
28
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need to be wisely aware that commemorative events
and monuments can mask as well as represent, and
can entrench misunderstandings from which we
need to be delivered.
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